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COMMENTARY
Learned Treatises in Illinois: Are We Witnessing the
Birth of a New Hearsay Exception?
ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
(Exceptions to the hearsay rule] resemble an old-fashioned crazy
quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists,
futurists and surrealists.'
It is a rare occurrence when courts add a new "patch" to the
"crazy quilt" of hearsay exceptions. Therefore, it is somewhat star-
tling to discover that Illinois is on the brink of creating an exception
for learned treatises. This commentary traces the development of
this potential exception. In so doing, it will attempt to understand
how a commondaw court traverses a twisted path to arrive at an
unforseen destination; a destination so unanticipated that, in this
case, the Illinois courts seem relatively unaware of where they have
arrived.
LEARNED TREATISES: FROM Ellis THROUGH Darling
The use of books, pamphlets, studies and other written materials
in the trial process is hardly a new phenomena. As early as 1878 the
Illinois Supreme Court had approved the use of textbooks for cross-
examining an expert witness. In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Ellis,2 an expert testified that the cause of the decedent's
death was excessive use of alcohol, a fact which, if true, would
excuse payment under the life insurance policy. The witness stated
that he had read texts on delerium tremens, but did not specify
what those texts were. On cross-examination, plaintiffs attorney
read passages from standard texts in the field and asked the expert
whether he agreed with those passages. The court discerned little
difference whether the questions asked of the expert were read out
of a textbook or framed independently by counsel; there was no
better way to test fully the expert's knowledge. 3 The thrust of the
opinion approves the use of texts and treatises to probe the expert
* Associate Professor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.S., University of
Wisconsin, 1963; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1966.
1. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 H Av. L. REV. 909,
921 (1937).
2. 89 Il. 516 (1878).
3. Id. at 519.
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witness's knowledge. However, there is no intimation in the opinion
that these books could be used substantively to prove the facts
contained in them.
This interpretation of Ellis was reaffirmed in later cases.4 How-
ever, its scope as an impeachment decision was also restricted. The
developing Illinois position was that an expert witness could be
cross-examined from learned treatises only to the extent that the
expert had relied on those treatises in arriving at his opinion in the
particular case. 5 The sole purpose of cross-examining an expert
witness in Illinois has always been to impeach. Hence, any attempts
to introduce a treatise substantively have been rebuffed.' This
stance of the Illinois courts was criticized by both commentators7
and the bar.'
In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, the
Supreme Court of Illinois reacted to this criticism.' The rule that
an expert witness can be questioned only about texts upon which
he expressly relies was set aside:
[The rule] is supported by the considerations that support the
hearsay rule, but the inapplicability of those considerations to sci-
entific works has been convincingly demonstrated . . ..
4. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Monka, 107 Ill. 340 (1883); City of Bloomington v.
Schrock, 110 Ill. 219 (1884).
5. City of Bloomington v. Schrock, 110 Ill. 219 (1884). In the early part of this century
there was considerable controversy over the method by which a cross-examiner determined
the expert's reliance. If the expert testified on direct examination that he used a certain
treatise, then cross-examination could be based on that treatise. Otherwise, the cross-
examiner would ask the expert if he relied on a specific treatise. If the witness answered yes,
the cross-examiner would ask questions based on the treatise. This procedure received appar-
ent approval in Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Ertrachter, 228 Ill. 114, 81 N.E. 816 (1907).
However, a number of appellate courts later held that the name of a specific book could not
be mentioned by the cross-examiner. All the cross-examiner could do was to ask the expert
if he relied on any treatises and, if so, which one. If the witness answered yes and specified
the treatise, then cross-examination could proceed on the basis of the treatise. If the witness
answered in the negative, the attorney had to take his answer. See, e.g., Neiner v. Chicago
City Ry. Co., 181 Il. App. 449 (1st Dist. 1913). The supreme court eventually approved this
latter position. Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 265 Ill. 338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914).
6. See, e.g., Browdie v. City of Lewistown, 164 Ill. App. 335 (3rd Dist. 1911); Shaw v.
Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 173 Ill. App. 107 (1st Dist. 1912).
7. The Illinois stance reflected the attitude of most state judiciaries toward the use of
learned treatises. While most criticism was directed against the restrictive use of treatises in
the impeachment process, some commentators vehemently argued for its sustantive admissi-
bility. See, e.g., 6 J. WIoMoaE, EviDENcE §1690-92 (Chadborn rev. 1976) [hereinafter cited
WIGMORE]. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), held that for federal courts, a cross-
examiner could use any treatise that was authoritative, whether or not relied on by the expert.
8. The Illinois Bar Association criticized this line of cases by pointing out that the "cagey"
or "coached" witness could testify that his opinion was based on his own experience and thus
preclude the use of any text on cross-examination. Illinois State Bar Association, Section on
Civil Practice and Procedure, 7 Trial Briefs 1-3 (Nov. 1964).
9. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
10. Id. at 335, 211 N.E.2d at 259.
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Preventing cross-examination upon the entire field of the witness's
expertise only served to protect the ignorant "expert." Therefore,
the court further stated that
expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of
justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recog-
nized authorities, expressed in treatises or periodicals written for
professional colleagues."
Confusion concerning the appropriate role of learned treatises
stems from these two quotations. Although the Darling court recog-
nized that the hearsay rule should be inapplicable to treatises, it
still did not hold the treatises to be substantively admissible. Yet
the court did not expressly limit the use of the texts solely for im-
peachment purposes. Nevertheless, the apparent limitation of trea-
tises to cross-examination has lead all commentators to conclude
that Darling was exclusively concerned with the impeachment pro-
cess.
12
LEARNED TREATISES: FROM Darling To Roddy
The cases following Darling limited the use of learned treatises to
the cross-examination stage of the expert's testimony, thereby rein-
forcing the view that treatises were not substantively admissible. 3
However, in People v. Gillespie, the second district intimated an
alteration in this view. 4 In this entirely circumstantial case, the
prosecution, attempting to prove that the defendant robbed a store,
introduced blood samples taken from the scene and compared these
with blood taken from the defendant. The blood proved to be type
A with a positive rheumatoid arthritis factor. The state's expert
testified that only 2.7 percent of the black population had blood of
11. Id. at 336, 211 N.E.2d at 259. The Darling decision was anticipated in Deeke v. Steffke
Freight Co., 50 Il. App. 2d 1, 199 N.E.2d 442 (2nd Dist. 1964). In this wrongful death case,
the plaintiffs expert testified as to braking distances, within which defendant's truck should
have been able to stop. On cross-examination, the expert was presented with a chart contain-
ing breaking distances and was asked whether he agreed with the dimensions set therein. The
expert had not relied upon the chart in direct examination. The trial court permitted the
question and the appellate court affirmed. It held that since the witness acknowledged the
chart to be accurate, no false impression was created.
12. See, e.g., C. McCORMIcK, EvtDNzcE §321, at 743 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRMICK]; FED. R. Evm. 803 (18) (Advisory Committee Comment).
13. See, e.g., In re Urbasek, 76 ill. App. 2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1st Dist. 1966); Taylor
v. Carborundum Co., 107 Ill. App. 2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 898 (1st Dist. 1965). In Carborundum,
the court was concerned with whether the treatises were within the expert's field. A chemist
had testified that variations in the density of a wheel caused it to shatter. The court refused
to allow him to be cross-examined about a "Safety Code" for abrasive wheels, since he
admitted to being unfamiliar with the grinding wheel manufacturing industry.
14. 24 Ill. App. 3d 567, 321 N.E.2d 398 (2d Dist. 1974).
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that classification. He based his opinion, in part, on blood frequency
statistics published by various pharmaceutical companies. The de-
fendant objected to the testimony as based on hearsay and argued
it was inadmissible.15 The trial court overruled the objection and the
defendant was subsequently convicted.
This conviction was affirmed by the appellate court, which held
that the expert's opinion was properly admitted. The court analo-
gized the pharmaceutical material to mortality tables which are
generally assumed to be admissible."6 However, this data was pub-
lished in journals which normally would have been inadmissible
themselves. Thus, the court went further than prior Illinois courts
in admitting the evidence. The court held that the reliability of the
evidence was shown by the publisher's lack of motive to fabricate,
the potential scrutiny of the material by others in the field, and the
dependence of the publisher's reputation on the validity of the ma-
terials. '1
The next step occurred when the fifth district in People v.
Behnke's read Darling as establishing a modified hearsay exception.
In Behnke, the defendant was charged with possession of lysergic
acid diethylamide (L.S.D.). His expert testified that the tablets
taken from the defendant did not contain L.S.D. The government
attempted to cross-examine the expert on the basis of a federal
government manual for training forensic chemists. The witness did
not recognize the authoritativeness of the manual and the state
tried to authenticate it through its own expert. The appellate court
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the manual's au-
thoritativeness had not been established. 9 However, in dicta, the
court took the extraordinary position of representing Darling as a
partial recognition of the learned treatise exception to the hearsay
rule. 0 Moreover, the court apparently did not realize that it was the
15. Formerly, in Illinois an expert opinion had to be based on admitted or, at least,
admissible evidence. That is no longer the Illinois position. See People v. Ward, 61 111. 2d
559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975); Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976).
The Ward case and the basis of expert opinion is discussed in Spector, People v. Ward:
Toward a Reconstruction of Expert Testimony in Illinois, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 284 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Spector].
16. City of Joliet v. Blower, 155 Ill. 414, 40 N.E. 619 (1885); Henderson v. Harness, 184
Ill. 520, 56 N.E. 786 (1900); Sherman v. Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 391, 250 N.E.2d 537
(1969). While this exception to the hearsay rule has never been actually rationalized, it exists
in most jurisdictions. Wigmore argued that it was merely a form of a learned treatise.
WIGMORE, supra note 7, at §1698.
17. These are the considerations usually specified in justifying learned treatises as an
exception to the hearsay rule. See text accompanying notes 28 through 31 infra.
18. 41111. App. 3d 276, 353 N.E.2d 684 (5th Dist. 1976).
19. This holding seems dubious. See text accompanying notes 38 through 39 infra.
20. 41111. App. 3d at 280, 353 N.E.2d at 688.
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first Illinois court to suggest that texts and treatises could be used
for substantive proof.2 ' While the issue in Behnke arose on cross-
examination, there was no indication in the opinion that recognizing
a learned treatise exception would confine the use of such material
for impeachment purposes.
The step that was implicit in Behnke was rendered explicit in
Roddy v. Chicago & N.W. R.R.22 In Roddy, the defendant at-
tempted to introduce in its case-in-chief a bulletin from the Na-
tional Safety Council relating to the stopping distances of standard
size automobiles. The defendant was allowed to read from the bulle-
tin over plaintiff's objection that it was hearsay. The appellate court
agreed with plaintiff's characterization of the bulletin as hearsay,
but continued the inquiry to determine whether it qualified as a
learned treatise. The court held that the bulletin was not authorita-
tive because there was no indication as to the identity of the author
or whether the author was an expert in the subject area. Thus,
Roddy assumed a learned treatises exception to the hearsay rule and
confined its discussion to whether the bulletin qualified for that
exception.
However, there is still no Illinois case expressly holding that a
treatise can be substantively admissible. Behnke suggested such an
exception, but that case involved the use of a treatise on cross-
examination. Roddy, by contrast, involved the use of a treatise on
direct examination. The court implied that had the defendant laid
a proper foundation the bulletin would have been admissible. It is
inevitable that trial lawyers will, in the future, lay the proper foun-
dation and cite Behnke and Roddy as authority for admitting the
text or treatise.
Thus, by a slow process of common law accretion, Illinois may
have recognized a new hearsay exception. However, before the final
step on this path is taken, it is appropriate to discuss whether the
courts are traveling the proper road. Creating new exceptions to the
hearsay rule involves balancing various aspects of the trial process,
and should not be performed by one-line assumptions in appellate
court opinions. Since rationale behind the learned treatise exception
is not obvious on its face, nor is there complete agreement among
courts and commentators as to its scope, the remainder of this com-
mentary will indicate why the path is a reasonable one and will also
21. The dissenting judge did not quarrel with the majority's characterization of learned
treatises as an exception to the hearsay rule. His dissent focused, instead, on the authorita-
tiveness of the manual. 41 111. App. 3d at 284, 353 N.E. 2d at 690.
22. 48 Il1. App. 3d 548, 363 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1977).
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express some thoughts as to the character of the ultimate destina-
tion.
RATIONALE FOR LEARNED TREATISES As AN EXCEPTION To THE
HEARSAY RULE
A modern approach to the law of evidence clearly indicates that
Illinois courts are proceeding correctly. Commentators and codifiers
have long argued for the adoption of the learned treatise exception. 2
Texts and treatises meet the test of reliability to qualify as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, and their substantive use would greatly
improve the quality of litigation in Illinois courts.
It is undisputed that treatises, when offered for the truth of their
contents, are hearsay. It is also recognized that hearsay is excluded
because it is subject to four dangers: (1) the ambiguity of the declar-
ant's language; (2) the declarant's sincerity; (3) the declarant's per-
ception; (4) the declarant's memory.2" Recently, Professor Tribe dia-
grammed these dangers as a triangle.25 The dangers of ambiguity of
language and sincerity form the left side of the triangle and repre-
sent the dangers associated with the inference of the declarant's
belief from the declarant's statement. The dangers of perception
and memory are on the right side of the triangle and represent the
problems associated with the inference of the existence of the event
from the belief of the declarant.21 While these dangers are present
in all testimony, courts usually assume that they can be alleviated
by cross-examination.
The present catalogue of exceptions allows a vast amount of hear-
say evidence to be admitted. 27 Admissible hearsay is not free from
all the dangers mentioned above. If all out-of-court statements were
required to be free from hearsay dangers, few such statements would
qualify. Professor Tribe points out that most hearsay exceptions
minimize the dangers on at least one side of the triangle. 2s Thus, if
23. See WlaMoRE, supra note 7; Note, Learned Treatises, 46 IOWA L. REV. 463 (1961); Note,
Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct Evidence in Wisconsin-Lewandowski v. Pre-
ferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 66 MIcH. L. REV. 183 (1967); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 529;
UNIFORm RuLES OF EVIDENCE 63(31).
24. See, e.g., Morgan, Hearsay Dangers And The Application Of The Hearsay Concept,
62 HxAv. L. REV. 177 (1948).
25. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HASv. L. REV. 957 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Tribe].
26. Id. at 959.
27. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331 (1961); Ladd, The Hear-
say We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271 (1952).
28. Tribe, supra note 25, at 966. Tribe notes that hearsay exceptions actually fall into
three classes: first, those statements which have an adequate procedural substitute for cross-
examination, i.e., former testimony; second, those statements where it is thought that a party
[Vol. 9
New Hearsay Exception
problems of ambiguity and sincerity are few, or if problems of per-
ception and memory are few, the statement should be admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule.
Commentators have long agreed that treatises present little, if
any, problem of ambiguity and sincerity."9 The text or treatise writer
normally expresses his thoughts on paper expecting that others will
read them. Since a misunderstood book is practically useless, a
writer is motivated to present his thoughts as clearly and concisely
as possible. A book is subject to criticism by the author's collegues
and thus runs a gamut of professional "cross examination." In many
fields the text is relied upon and used by other members of the
profession in arriving at their own views in particular areas. These
considerations combine to insure that the danger of ambiguity of
language is minimal.
The hearsay danger of sincerity also appears to be satisfied. The
text writer is not preparing the work for a particular lawsuit. Hence
there is no legally-related bias or self-interest underlying the treatise
that compels exclusion. While it is possible for the writer to be a
member of a particular school of thought, that problem is no more
prevalent than when an expert testifies in person. Thus, with prob-
lems of sincerity and ambiguity satisfied, a treatise is as reliable as
other exceptions that rely on the minimization of those problems.30
has no right to cross-examine, i.e., admissions of a party opponent; third, those statements
which seem to satisfy one leg of the triangle. Thus, a declaration against interest can be
thought of as a strong left leg exception because the dangers of ambiguity and sincerity are
minimal. A declaration of bodily condition is a strong right leg exception because the dangers
of perception and memory are minimized.
29. WIGMORE, supra note 7; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §321 at 743-45; 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §803 (18) [011 at 803-214 (1976); Tribe, supra note 25, at
966-67; Comment, Learned Treatises As Direct Evidence: The Alabama Experience, 1967
DUKE L.J. 1169; see also the authorities cited in note 23 supra.
Judicial recognition of the exception has been slow. Only Wisconsin and Alabama have
judicially recognized learned treatises as an exception to the hearsay rule. Lewandowski v.
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966); City of Dolthan
v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Stoudenmier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1847). A
few states have recognized the exception by court rule. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN., §60-460
(cc) (1964). Approximately a dozen states have statutes that could be construed to admit
some texts and treatises. See Note, Medical Treatises To Be Admitted as Direct Evidence in
Wisconsin-Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 66 MICH. L. REv. 183, 184 n. 4
(1967). The Federal Rules of Evidence contain a learned treatise exception in Rule 803 (18);
approximately ten states have followed the federal rules in their own evidence codifications.
Federal Rules of Evidence News 77-41 (June, 1977).
30. Indeed, it may be more reliable than some exceptions, i.e., excited utterances. The
learned treatise exception is sometimes justified on the need for the evidence. For example,
it has been suggested that the treatise could serve as a substitute expert in medical malprac-
tice cases, where it is often extremely difficult for plaintiffs to obtain reputable medical
experts. The recent explosion of large recoverys and statutory "malpractice statutes"
throughout the country suggest that this is no longer the case.
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The objections that are normally made to learned treatises are:
(1) the writer is not available to be cross-examined; (2) concepts
tend to change rapidly, and thus books become outdated; (3) mate-
rial from a book can be presented out of context; (4) the jury will
be confused by the technical language of the book; (5) the trial
would become a "battle of books"; and (6) the impact of the books
on the jury would be overwhelming.'
Only the first of these objections is pertinent to the hearsay aspect
of learned treatises. However, the minimization of the language and
sincerity dangers easily compensates for this lack of cross-
examination. The other objections relate more to relevancy than to
hearsay and do not justify a blanket rule of exclusion against
learned treatises. They constitute problems entrusted to the discre-
tion of the trial judge. For example, if the facts and concepts found
in the treatise are dated, it may lack probative value and could be
excluded. If one party quotes the treatise out of context the remain-
der of the treatise could be introduced under the "doctrine of com-
pleteness. '3 2 The dangers of the jury being confused or unduly
swayed by a treatise are similar to the problems of confusion and
prejudice involved in admitting all circumstantial evidence. The
trial judge has discretion to balance these factors against the proba-
tive value of the text in order to determine its admissibility. As to
the "battle of the books," it is not really different from the omnipre-
sent "battle of the experts."
The substantive admission of learned treatises would greatly im-
prove the quality of litigation in Illinois. Presently, texts can be used
in a trial for two different purposes. First, Darling and its progeny
authorize their use to impeach an expert. Second, recent supreme
court decisions have held that an expert may use out-of-court infor-
mation as part of the basis of his opinion.3 This information which
is used by the expert need not be admissible at trial, so long as it is
the type of information upon which experts in that field would nor-
mally rely.34 It also appears that the expert may relate the out-of-
31. The above objections are taken from Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Com-
ment on Rule 63 (31) at 212 (1963).
32. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §56 at 131.
33. People v. Ward, 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975); Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976).
34. The Illinois Supreme Court may have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 703. That
rule reads as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
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court statements to the fact finder for the purpose of explaining how
he arrived at his opinion.35
The result is that the information contained in a text or treatise
is placed before the jury with a somewhat complicated instruction.
The jury is told that it can use the text for evaluating the method
by which the expert arrived at his opinion, and for assessing the
credibility of the expert, but it may not find as facts those state-
ments contained in the treatise. This exercise in mental gymnastics
may well be beyond the jury's competence. A hearsay exception for
learned treatises would complement the other two reasons for ad-
missibility," by removing the confusion and allowing the jury to use
the treatises substantively, as it may, in its confusion, be doing now.
SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTION
Illinois should adopt a learned treatise exception based on the
Uniform Rules of Evidence37 rather than the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.3" The primary difference between the two models concerns
the role of the expert. Under the Uniform Rules the expert must
only authenticate the authoritativeness of the writing in question.
He need not explain the writing to the fact-finder. Under the Fed-
eral Rules, the book is seen as an adjunct to the expert. The text or
treatise is not admissible unless it is relied on by the expert in direct
examination, or is used in his cross-examination. The presence of
the expert is always necessary to explain, qualify, or otherwise inter-
pret the text for the fact-finder. The reason for this limitation, ac-
cording to the Advisory Committee, is to avoid the danger of the
jury misunderstanding and misapplying the text. 9
Rule 703 is discussed in Spector, supra note 15.
35. This seems to have occurred in Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543,356 N.E.2d
779 (1976).
36. See, e.g., K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBERG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 279-80
(1975), suggesting that Rule 703 (basis) must be read with Rule 803 (18) (learned treatises).
37. Uniform Rule 63 (31) (1953):
A published treatise, periodical, or pamphlet on a subject of history, science, or art
to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a
reliable authority in the subject.
38. Federal Rule 803(18):
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination
or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in published
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other sci-
ence or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
39. FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (Advisory Committee Comment).
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The Federal Rules approach is too restrictive. Texts and treatises
are extremely varied. Some are unduly complicated and cannot be
understood without extensive training in the author's discipline.
Others, however, are manuals that can be adequately understood by
the layman. The trial judge should have considerable discretion in
determining which are admissible by themselves and which require
explanation by an expert in order to be intelligently understood by
the jury.
A further problem is determining what treatises are "learned"
within the scope of the exception. People v. Behnke,40 for instance,
took a very restrictive approach toward this question. The defen-
dant, in appealing his conviction for possessing L.S.D., contended
that his expert had been improperly cross-examined on the basis of
a non-authoritative treatise. The government had examined the de-
fendant's expert on the basis of a Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs manual entitled "Basic Training Program for Fo-
rensic Drug Chemists." The court found that the manual was not
authoritative for several reasons: there was no independent proof of
who the authors were; the manual was written with a view toward
litigation; and there was no independent proof of the authorita-
tiveness of the manual.
This view is too restraining. Independent proof need not be intro-
duced concerning the expertise of the authors or the authorita-
tiveness of the text. All that should be required is that the expert
testify that the authors are experts and that the text is reliable. This
may be accomplished by the expert who is basing an opinion on the
text. In Behnke, the court refused to allow the government chemist
to authenticate the text because it thought he was biased in favor
of the state. Such reasoning would exclude all expert testimony. In
this case, the bias of the witness went to credibility, not admissibil-
ity.
The court also incorrectly stated that the manual was prepared
for purposes of litigation. The dissenting judge correctly points out
that the scientific chemical tests discussed in the manual exist inde-
pendent of any prosecution. While a book prepared specifically for
admission at trial might be excluded as untrustworthy, that was
certainly not the case in Behnke. Thus the court took the anomalous
position of allowing the state's chemist to state an opinion based on
a manual that it would not allow to be used to cross-examine the
opposing expert because it was not authoritative.
Nevertheless, some standard must be applied to determine if the
40. 41 111. App. 3d 276, 353 N.E.2d 684 (5th Dist. 1976).
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text is authoritative. On this point Illinois should adopt the Federal
Rules approach. Under the Federal Rules there is a clear nexus
between the basis of expert opinion and learned treatises.' The
result is that if the text is of a type that an expert could use in
arriving at an opinion, it is admissible as a learned treatise. Thus,
the appropriate standard is whether experts in the field rely on the
text in framing opinions or drawing inferences." This foundation
could be laid either by the expert who is testifying, or by any expert
who could be qualified to so testify. This approach has the distinct
advantage of avoiding any possibility that the jury could become
confused as to the reason why a text or treatise is admitted. Once a
text is admitted, it could be used as basis, impeachment, and as
substantive evidence.
CONCLUSION
Illinois is on the verge of joining those jurisdictions that recognize
learned treatises as an exception to the hearsay rule. Learned trea-
tises have a reliability equivalent to most other hearsay exceptions.
Their substanntive use would eliminate the confusing and anoma-
lous method that these texts presently serve in the trial process.
This is another step in the reconstruction of expert testimony in
Illinois . 3
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Of course, in exceptional cases, the judge could take judicial notice of the authorita-
tiveness of the text.
43. See Spector, supra note 15.
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